

Australia, Japan and Minilateralism in the Economic-Security Nexus

By
H.D.P. Envall
Australian National University

(経済安全保障ネクサスにおける日豪ミニラテリズム)

**Paper presented to the 2023 Annual Convention of the Japan Association of
International Relations**

November 12, 2023

Abstract

Japan and Australia have a common interest in cooperating to boost their resilience in the face of coercive economic practices by major powers in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, the two countries are pursuing minilateral arrangements to achieve this economic-security goal, with areas of emerging cooperation in energy transition, supply-chain security, as well as critical and emerging technologies. This paper will examine Australia-Japan minilateral cooperation in this nexus between economics and security. It will demonstrate that growing minilateral cooperation is due to its inherent agility and adaptability in the face of a rapidly changing region and also because such arrangements can be easily built on a base of established bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Introduction

Minilateralism is increasingly viewed by a range of actors as the “way to get things done” in the Indo-Pacific.¹ Indeed, this applies not only to the security sphere, but also to

¹ Thomas Wilkins, “Australia, Japan and the Revival of Indo-Pacific Minilateralism,” roundtable presentation

geoeconomics. Wilkins, for instance, argues that, while minilaterals may be “functionally specific,” they may also be used to pursue agenda that are multi-faceted and comprehensive.”² Why would minilaterals be useful for countries such as Japan and Australia to get things done in the nexus between economics and security? What are they doing already when it comes to minilateralism? And how should they do minilateralism in the future? This paper represents a first attempt at exploring the scope for minilateral cooperation between Australia and Japan, especially concerning the economic-security nexus. The intention is not only to look at key forms of minilateral cooperation already including Japan and Australia but also to consider potential future minilateral initiatives the two countries might pursue.

The central argument is that the growth in minilateral cooperation and the drive by Japan and Australia to deepen their minilateral initiatives—“to get things done”—are the result of key features inherent in the minilateral process. This is because minilateral institutions offer various advantages over multilateral and bilateral alternatives. They have an adaptability and functionality often missing from multilateral bodies while also providing a “force-multiplier” effect absent from bilateral arrangements. They also allow for greater innovation in coalition-building. What might be called “hybrid minilateralism,” where single actors or small groups of actors join with multilateral bodies, offers the opportunity for actors to engage with multilateral bodies but in less formal, more functional, and more pragmatic ways. So Japan and Australia could engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or particular ASEAN members in more narrowly defined areas of mutual economic interests without requiring a full multilateral apparatus. Such features may prove appealing to secondary powers like Japan and Australia as they seek to cope with the rapidly changing balance of power in the region. And they are particularly appealing in the geoeconomic sphere, enabling countries to broaden the scope of their economic cooperation and to build coalitions against economic coercion more quickly and easily.

In making this case, the paper proceeds in three stages. First, it sets out the conceptual framework for understanding minilateralism and the economic-security nexus in the international relations of the Indo-Pacific. Second, it outlines the ways in which economic coercion have affected Japan and Australia and how these two countries have come to view such geoeconomic actions in policy terms. Third, it examines examples of Japanese and

made at the Australia-Japan Foundation “Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism” Workshop, March 2, 2023, Canberra, Australian National University.

² Thomas S. Wilkins, “The Quad and AUKUS Strengthen Australia’s Hand in a Contested Indo-Pacific,” *Strategist*, June 1, 2022, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-quad-and-aukus-strengthen-australias-hand-in-a-contested-indo-pacific/>.

Australian involvement in minilateral institutions with geoeconomic dimensions and considers the likely emergence of new areas of minilateral innovation. Finally, it concludes with a brief assessment of the current “state of play” in regional minilateralism and the prospects for future Japanese-Australian minilateral cooperation.

What is minilateralism in the economic-security nexus?

Wilkins defines minilaterals as “small-group (typically 3-6 members) configurations that bring together ‘like-minded’ partners in alignment to work on practical solutions to shared policy challenges.”³ Minilateralism, therefore, constitutes one of the three layers of “security architecture” operating in international affairs—the other being multilateralism and bilateralism.⁴ Security architecture, here, refers to “an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region’s policy concerns and achieves its security object.”⁵ Minilateralism is obviously meant to differ from these other layers. In terms of bilateralism, the distinction is simply a matter of numbers. Yet, as Singh and Teo point out, the distinction between minilateralism and multilateralism is less clear.⁶ They both involve multiple actors, although there is an assumption that minilateralism should be smaller. Beyond this, minilateralism can be distinguished by the fact that it tends toward great exclusivity in membership (e.g. “like-minded” partners), focuses on achieving “critical mass” (to achieve its solutions), is more flexible in its arrangements, and is less formal and more focused on “functionality.”⁷ The intention of those who seek to establish minilateral institutions is often to “draw on the relative strengths of both bilateralism and multilateralism.”⁸ As such, this emphasis on limited partnership, pragmatism, and flexibility is well captured by Koga, who argues that Asia’s new “strategic minilateralism” is “largely a Western construct ... to fill the

³ Wilkins, “The Quad and AUKUS Strengthen Australia’s Hand in a Contested Indo-Pacific.”

⁴ Thomas S. Wilkins, “The ‘Minilateral Moment’ and the Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific.” *NIDS Commentary* 254, February 16, 2023,

<http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary254e.pdf>. See also Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (1992): 681–708; Victor D. Cha, “The Dilemma of Regional Security in East Asia: Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism,” in *Regional Conflict Management*, ed. Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 104–22; Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo, “Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” in *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, ed. Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (London: Routledge, 2020), 1–12.

⁵ William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, “What is Asian Security Architecture?” *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 95–116, at 96.

⁶ Singh and Teo, “Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” 4–6.

⁷ Singh and Teo, “Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” 4–6.

⁸ William T. Tow and H.D.P. Envall, “The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Pacific: Can Convergent Security Work?” *IFANS Review* 19, no. 2 (2011): 49–72, at 62.

expectation and capability gaps in regional security systems for underwriting the existing regional order.”⁹

While it might once have been true that minilateralism was an understudied area of international relations,¹⁰ this has changed in recent years as the number of studies examining minilateralism in Asia (or the Indo-Pacific) has grown.¹¹ Some studies have examined key minilateral bodies, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, or AUKUS (the security entity bringing together Australia, the US, and the UK).¹² Others have considered the approach of particular countries toward regional minilateralism.¹³

Some of the key themes to emerge thus far been the linkages between minilateralism and deterrence as well as between minilateralism and order-building, particularly in terms of attempts to redefine the broader Asian (or Asia-Pacific) region as the Indo-Pacific.¹⁴ Pure security concerns, therefore, have tended to overshadow broader debates on how minilaterals might operate in the geoeconomic space—the so-called nexus between economics and security. However, as geoeconomic competition has become a key feature of the

⁹ Kei Koga, “A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 27–34, at 27.

¹⁰ On the early neglect of minilateralism, see Michael J. Green, “Strategic Asian Triangles,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, ed. Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 758–74.

¹¹ See, for example, Troy Lee-Brown, “Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific,” *East Asia* 35 (2018): 163–76; Evan A. Laksmana, “Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?” *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 35–42; Arzan Tarapore and Brendan Taylor, “Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus,” *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 2–7; John Nilsson-Wright, “Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Opportunities for Security Convergence and Cooperation between Australia, India and Japan,” Chatham House Research Paper (Lond: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017); Tongfi Kim, “Asia’s Minilateral Moment,” *Diplomat*, June 12, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/asias-minilateral-moment>.

¹² On the Quad, for example, see Andrew O’Neil and Lucy West, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Indo-Pacific Minilateralism: Resurrection without Renewal?” in *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, ed. Bhuhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (London: Routledge, 2020), 27–41. For the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, see William T. Tow, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Minilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Order Building,” in *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*, ed. Yuki Tatsumi (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), 23–35. Regarding AUKUS and the Quad, see Tomohiko Satake, “The Rise of ‘Minilateralism’ in the Indo-Pacific: The Quad & AUKUS,” *Japan Spotlight*, March/April 2023, 29–32, https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/248th_Cover_Story_04.pdf.

¹³ On the US and minilateralism, for example, see William T. Tow, “Minilateralism and US Security Policy in the Indo-Pacific: The Legacy, Viability and Deficiencies of a New Security Approach,” in *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, ed. Bhuhindar Singh and Sarah Teo (London: Routledge, 2020), 13–26; William T. Tow, “Minilateral Security’s Relevance to US Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Prospects,” *Pacific Review* 32, no. 2 (2019): 232–44.

¹⁴ Key texts on the rise of the Indo-Pacific include Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 4 (2014): 453–69; Rory Medcalf, *Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won’t Map the Future* (Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2020); Kai He, “Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the ‘Indo-Pacific’ from an IR Theory Perspective,” *East Asia* 35, no. 2 (2018): 149–61. On Japan’s entrepreneurial role in boosting the idea of the Indo-Pacific, see H.D.P. Envall and Thomas S. Wilkins, “Japan and the New Indo-Pacific Order: The Rise of an Entrepreneurial Power,” *Pacific Review* 36, no. 4 (2023): 691–722.

contemporary regional order, the relevance of minilateralism to the economic-security nexus, and vice versa, has become ever more apparent. As Goldstein and Mansfield argue, the interplay between economics and security operates in two directions. Even as economic interests affect the security domain, so too security interests shape economic relations. Minilaterals, to the extent that they are being used to fill expectation and capability gaps in the region's security system, have emerged in part because they can be used to develop policies that also shape the region in these two directions.¹⁵

As strategic rivalry has expanded more into previously separated economic fields, the idea of the economic-security nexus, like minilateralism, has grown in prevalence.¹⁶ Yoshimatsu views the economic-security nexus as comprised of two dimensions.¹⁷ The first concerns the linkages between conflict and economic interdependence, such as whether the latter reduces the likelihood of the former. The second dimension, which is more relevant to minilateralism as a policy tool, relates to statecraft and the policies adopted by nation-states. It is concerned with how actors in international relations might make use of economic activities to pursue strategic goals. This statecraft might be short-term or long-term in approach. In the short-term, states may seek to use economic sticks and carrots to “exert pressure” on other states over immediate concerns, such as diplomatic or territorial disputes. In the longer term, however, states may attempt to create broader asymmetries in their economic relationships with other states. Such asymmetries then offer the advantaged state an opportunity to convert economic asymmetries into deeper strategic influence.¹⁸

Japan, Australia and economic coercion

Much of the focus of cooperation between Japan and Australia has been on the security sphere.¹⁹ Yet these two countries do also have a keen shared interest in utilizing minilateral

¹⁵ Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, “The Political Economy of Regional Security in East Asia,” in *The Nexus of Economics, Security, and International Relations in East Asia*, ed. Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 1–38, at 13.

¹⁶ For example, see T.J. Pempel, ed., *The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 2013); Yul Sohn and T.J. Pempel, eds., *Japan and Asia's Contested Order: The Interplay of Security, Economics, and Identity* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Rosemary Foot and Amy King, “Assessing the Deterioration in China–U.S. Relations: U.S. Governmental Perspectives on the Economic-Security Nexus,” *China International Strategic Review* 1 (2019): 39–50.

¹⁷ Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Economic-Security Linkages in Asia,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, ed. Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 569–85 at 570–72.

¹⁸ Yoshimatsu, “Economic-Security Linkages in Asia,” 572.

¹⁹ On Japan-Australia security cooperation, see Thomas S. Wilkins, “After a Decade of Strategic Partnership: Japan and Australia ‘Decentering’ from the US Alliance?” *Pacific Review* 31, no. 4 (2018): 498–514; Thomas S. Wilkins, “Elevating the Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership to ‘a New Level’: Challenges and Responses.” *JIIA Policy Brief*, April 13, 2021; H.D.P. Envall and Thomas S. Wilkins. “Japan and Australia: Forging an Indo-

approaches in the economic-security nexus as a way of increasing their own cooperation and also meeting particular geoeconomic needs. In keeping with Yoshimatsu's characterization of the economic-security nexus as statecraft, both countries have a common interest in preventing or minimizing the use of coercive economic tools for strategic purposes in the Indo-Pacific.²⁰ Japan, for instance, as Suzuki and Wallace note, "is exposed more than ever to various intersecting forms of military and economic coercion."²¹ Concern about economic coercion applies both to their own positions in the region as well as to those of allies and partners. And it also applies to their need both to minimize vulnerabilities to short-term geoeconomic pressures and to avoid becoming subject to long-term economic asymmetries that might lead to geopolitical disadvantage. More broadly, Japan and Australia share a wider interest in the region and its economy operating in a transparent way and according to accepted international rules and norms. Such an order appeals both because of the potential economic benefits that might be accrued through greater efficiencies and because of the extra layer of protection it creates against geoeconomic coercion.

Both Japan and Australia, it is important to note, have been exposed to coercive economic actions in the region, particularly by China.²² Most recently, Australia has been on the receiving end of an attempted trade war initiated by Beijing. Indeed, as Wilson notes, Australia was "the first country to be subjected to an economy wide assault" in this way.²³ This assault entailed China erecting a range of sanctions on Australia goods as well as various non-tariff barriers. The affected industries in Australia were numerous. Impacted

Pacific Partnership," in *Handbook of Japanese Security*, ed. Leszek Buszynski (Tokyo: MHM Limited, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming 2023), 384–99. For Japan and Australia working together trilaterally in non-traditional security, see H.D.P. Envall, "Community Building in Asia? Trilateral Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief," in *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*, ed. Yuki Tatsumi (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015), 51–59. On Japan's approach to security unilateralism, see also H.D.P. Envall, "Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally," in *Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Wesley (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 15–30, at 26.

²⁰ Yoshimatsu, "Economic-Security Linkages in Asia," 572.

²¹ Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace, "Explaining Japan's Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability," *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2018): 711–34, at 711. See also H.D.P. Envall, "What Kind of Japan? Tokyo's Strategic Options in a Contested Asia," *Survival* 61, no. 4 (2019): 117–30, at 120.

²² Japan also faces serious security challenges with regard to China, including not only the Senkaku dispute but also in terms of the South China Sea and Taiwan. In terms of the South China Sea, see H.D.P. Envall, "South China Sea Perspectives: Japan," Parliamentary Library Research Paper, Parliament of Australia, October 7, 2022,

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2223/SouthChinaSeaPerspectivesJapan#_ftn1. For the Taiwan flashpoint, see Mike Mochizuki, "Tokyo's Taiwan Conundrum: What Can Japan Do to Prevent War?" *Washington Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2022): 81–107.

²³ Jeffrey Wilson, "Australia Shows the World What Decoupling from China Looks Like," *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/09/australia-china-decoupling-trade-sanctions-coronavirus-geopolitics/>.

agricultural products included barley, beef, wine, and lobsters, and a host of other products. Resources, such as copper and coal were also affected, although iron ore exports were left untouched. Even tourism and education were affected.²⁴ Beijing's sanctions followed the Australian government's demand, made by then Prime Minister Scott Morrison in April 2020, for an independent inquiry in the origins of Covid-19. However, Australia had toughened up its approach to foreign interference in its domestic politics in the years prior to Morrison's demand and had also banned the Chinese company, Huawei, from its 5G telecommunications network. Both these actors had angered Beijing. Along with a range of sanctions and the freezing of high-level contacts with the Australian government, China also released a list of 14 grievances to the Australia media, with the expectation being that these would need to be addressed if the relationship were to return to normal. Only with the sanctions proving to be largely ineffective did the Chinese government begin to seek to reset the bilateral relationship.²⁵

Japan has also found itself subject to "coercive behavior" (*iatsuteki na furumai*).²⁶ In terms of geoeconomics, it was also famously affected by informal or unofficial bans from China on the export of rare earth minerals in late 2010. This followed a dispute between the two countries over the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu islands in Chinese) in September that year.²⁷ A Chinese fishing vessel, apprehended by the Japan Coast Guard in the waters near the disputed islands, rammed the Japanese Coast Guard, with the captain subsequently detained by Japan for some time before being released back to China. The ensuing diplomatic fallout was described by the *Economist* at the time as the "worst diplomatic incident between the two countries in half a decade."²⁸ Not only were rare earth exports to Japan mysteriously delayed following the incident, but several Japanese executives were arrested in China. The impact on Japan was substantial. It destabilized the Japanese government, then led by the Democratic Party of Japan, and caused Japan to shift away from its more open position on regional

²⁴ See Victor Ferguson and Derren J. Lim, "Economic Power and Vulnerability in Sino-Australian Relations," in *China Story Yearbook: Crisis*, ed. Jane Golley, Linda Jaivin, and Sharon Strange (Canberra: ANU Press, 2021), 259–74, at 263–75.

²⁵ See Wilson, "Australia Shows the World What Decoupling from China Looks Like"; Richard McGregor, "Chinese Coercion, Australian Resilience," Lowy Institute Analysis, October 2022, 4–8; "Australia has Faced Down China's Trade Bans and Emerged Stronger," *Economist*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/05/23/australia-has-faced-down-chinas-trade-bans-and-emerged-stronger>.

²⁶ H.D.P. Envall, "Japan's 'Pivot' Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance," *Security Challenges* 12, no. 3 (2016): 5–19, at 10.

²⁷ H.D.P. Envall, "Clashing Expectations: Strategic Thinking and Alliance Mismanagement in Japan," in *United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: Perspectives from Asia*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Tan See Seng (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2015), 61–88, at 73.

²⁸ "Friends and Neighbours," *Economist*, November 20, 2010, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2010/11/20/friends-and-neighbours>.

engagement to a more threat-centered understanding of the region, as illustrated by the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2010.²⁹

Japanese and Australian perspectives regarding economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific are well illustrated through the two countries' official statements and documents. Firstly, in terms of Japan, in outlining his case for a broader Indo-Pacific, the late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō promoted a region that would value “freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy,” as well as being “free from force or coercion.”³⁰ Japan's focus on boosting “connectivity” as part of its vision for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” has rested on the idea of not only growing prosperity but also building a regional consensus around the rules governing international relations in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, this type of thinking was behind Japan's aim, set out in 2015, to “spread high-quality and innovative infrastructure throughout Asia, taking a long-term view.”³¹ To the extent that China is involved in such policy, Japan's focus has been on ensuring that the region should remain open if China abides by international economic norms and rules, but that there should mechanisms in place if it moves more to policies of coercion and seeks to dominate the region. According to Yoshimatsu, this approach therefore is one of “dominance-denial.”³²

Canberra's approach has been broadly similar to that pursued by Tokyo. For Australia, the Indo-Pacific region should be “open, inclusive and prosperous,” along with being “safe, secure and free.” The region should be able to deliver opportunities to the Australia economy while promoting “international rules.” Importantly, Australia seeks to create a region where the country's “ability to prosecute [its] interests freely is not constrained by the exercise of coercive power.”³³ Indeed, where Australia cooperates with

²⁹ H.D.P. Envall and Kiichi Fujiwara, “Japan's Misfiring Security Hedge: Discovering the Limits of Middle-Power Internationalism and ‘Strategic Convergence’,” in *Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia Pacific Region*, ed. William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 60–76, at 70–71.

³⁰ Abe Shinzō, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),” Nairobi, Kenya, August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html. For more on Abe's foreign policies, see H.D.P. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’: Japan's New Regional Realism,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 20, no. 1 (2020): 31–59.

³¹ Shinzo Abe, “The Future of Asia: Be Innovative,” speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia,” May 21, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html.

³² Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, *Japan's Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 103. See also H.D.P. Envall, “How Australia Can Work with Japan in the Indo-Pacific,” Research Paper, Griffith Asia Institute, 2022, 6, https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/1491837/Envall-Australia-Japan_IndoPacific-web.pdf.

³³ Australian Government, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Opportunity, Security, Strength* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), 3. See also Envall, “How Australia Can Work with Japan in the Indo-Pacific,” 4.

“like-minded partners,” this is intended to be part of “collective efforts to limit the exercise of coercive power and support an open global economy and rules-based international order.”³⁴ In June 2023, along with Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, Australia endorsed a joint declaration against trade-related economic coercion. The aim of the declaration was to express the countries’ “shared concern” and affirm their commitment to “enhance international cooperation in order to effectively deter and address trade-related economic coercion and non-market policies and practices.”³⁵

Japan, Australia and economic-security minilateralism

The first challenge for countries in the Indo-Pacific, at least with respect to China’s attempts at economic coercion, is the fact that China now plays such a substantial economic role in the region. China has established a dominance in Asia as the region’s “factory” and key supply-chain hub, as a major consumer of inputs and products from around the world, including Japan and Australia, as a source of foreign direct investment, as a builder of infrastructure, and as a supplier of key components in strategic areas, notably rare earth minerals.³⁶ All this means that China has significant potential to wield power in the nexus between economics and security, both in terms of the short-term deployment of sticks and carrots for specific diplomatic ends (as in Japan’s 2010 experience) and in terms of the long-term use of investment and trade asymmetries for deeper strategic influence (as in parts of Southeast Asia). As Cha notes, the long-term goal for China appears to be to “force governments and companies to anticipate, respect, and defer to Chinese interests in all future actions.”³⁷

How might minilaterals be used to build up resiliency against economic coercion and the broader use of economic asymmetries intended to generate long-term strategic influence? Quite obviously, neither Japan nor Australia has the capacity to confront China directly if it makes outright attempts at short-term economic coercion, although both have proved resilient

³⁴ Australian Government, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*, 7.

³⁵ Australian Government, “Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices,” June 8, 2023, <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-declaration-against-trade-related-economic-coercion-and-non-market-policies-and-practices>.

³⁶ On the general sources of Chinese economic power in the region, see Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Role in Asia: Attractive or Aggressive?” in *International Relations of Asia*, 3rd ed., ed. David Shambaugh (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), 115–38, at 119–21. On rare earths, see “Can Australia Break China’s Monopoly on Critical Minerals?” *Economist*, June 20, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/20/can-australia-break-chinas-monopoly-on-critical-minerals>.

³⁷ Victor Cha, “How to Stop Chinese Coercion: The Case for Collective Resilience,” *Foreign Affairs* 102, no. 1 (2023): 89–101, at 93. See also Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Fergus Hunter, et al., “Countering China’s Coercive Diplomacy: Prioritizing Economic Security, Sovereignty and the Rules-Based Order,” Policy Brief, Report no. 68/2023 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023).

(even independently) in the face of Chinese coercion. Australia's ability to adjust to the costs imposed by China during the trade tensions of 2020–2023 point to the importance of being able to diversify export markets quickly, although in part Australia was able to resist China's attempts at coercion because of the significant complementarities between the two countries' economies.³⁸ As active secondary powers in the Indo-Pacific, therefore, Australia and Japan arguably have significant roles to play in developing the necessary tools of statecraft to build resiliency in the face of economic coercion and wider geoeconomic challenges.

Indeed, as “entrepreneurial states” that need to advance their goals not through coercion but through coalition-building, Japan and Australia can be expected to focus on what America's Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has described as “anti-coercion” coalitions. The intention would be to offer support around the region in response to coercion attempts to provide “countervailing opportunities” to other countries to help with diversification and thus resiliency.³⁹ But the challenge for secondary powers in building such coalitions is to find the best set of arrangements to suit the purpose. Region-wide initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework initiated by the US Biden administration, offer multilateral mechanisms to pursue such goals. Yet these suffer from the usual weaknesses of multilateralism—they are overly rulebound and process-centered and, where they require consensus in decision-making, tend to move toward lowest-common-denominator outcomes. This has been a particular criticism of multilateral institutions associated with ASEAN.⁴⁰

Such weaknesses point to the reason why minilateralism has emerged as a more appealing option for regional institution-building over the past decade. Some of the potential strengths of minilaterals noted earlier—flexibility, functionality, or achieving a critical mass of like-minded partners—mean that they can be directed at coercive actions in a more focused way and more quickly. Importantly, minilaterals also have the benefit of greater dispensability than multilateral fora (when they are seen to have served their purpose) and thus should not suffer from the unchecked institutional growth that has accompanied multilateral groupings. Accordingly, they offer useful space for diplomatic innovation, with

³⁸ See “Australia has Faced Down China's Trade Bans and Emerged Stronger.”

³⁹ Rahm Emanuel, “An Anti-Coercion Coalition,” March 27, 2023, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/anti-coercion-coalition-ambassador-rahm-emanuel/>. On “entrepreneurial states,” see John Ravenhill, “Entrepreneurial States: A Conceptual Overview,” *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 73, no. 4 (2018): 501–17, at 507–08, 510. See also Envall and Wilkins, “Japan and the New Indo-Pacific Order,” 696.

⁴⁰ Wilkins, “The ‘Minilateral Moment,’” 5. On ASEAN, see also David M. Jones and Michael L. Smith, “Making Process, not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,” *International Security* 32, no. 1, (2007): 148–184.

states in a position, as Taylor outlines, “to let natural selection decide which minilaterals are ‘fit for purpose’ and which are left to flounder.”⁴¹ Lastly, when considered in the economic-security context, they tend to be less controversial than minilateralism focused just on security matters.

The major minilateral involving Japan and Australia—and one that includes clear geo-economic dimensions—has been the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad). The Quad brings together Japan and Australia with the US and India with a view to promoting the idea of the Indo-Pacific. It grew from cooperation between these four countries that began in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. Japan, in particular, sought to establish the Quad as a mean of pursuing “freedom and prosperity” in the region. Although Quad engagement dissipated in the following decade, it was brought back to life in 2017 in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness in Asia and has continued to develop since.⁴²

Despite some clear weaknesses, the Quad offers Japan and Australia many of these benefits that come with minilateralism. Importantly, it enables Japan and Australia with other “like-minded” partners to address both short-term and long-term geo-economic challenges in functional ways. The Quad has, for instance, quickly come to include anti-coercion cooperation. At the Quad leaders’ summit held in Hiroshima in May 2023, the four Quad members emphasized the need for regional actors to be “free from coercion.”⁴³ A particular focus was the objective enhancing energy security of the Quad members, especially in the area of clean energy supply chains and with respect to ensuring the production of “critical devices, components, and systems.”⁴⁴ The challenge with the Quad as the leading minilateral at the nexus of economics and security, however, is the fact that in terms of agenda, geo-economic matters tend to be overwhelmed by the wider geopolitics of the Quad members. Furthermore, the Quad sits atop bilateral relationships between the four members that are

⁴¹ Brendan Taylor, “Navigating the Strange Minilateraliverse of Madness,” *Interpreter*, May 18, 2023, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/navigating-strange-minilateraliverse-madness>.

⁴² Taro Aso, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” speech on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, November 30, 2006, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>; H.D.P. Envall, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards an Indo-Pacific Order?” Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep20011.1.pdf>; Kate Stevenson and H.D.P. Envall, “The ‘Quad’ and Disaster Management: An Australian Perspective,” in *International Disaster Response: Rebuilding the Quad?* Ed. Yuki Tatsumi and Jason Li (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2019), 13–23; Envall and Wilkins, “Japan and the New Indo-Pacific Order,” 704–05.

⁴³ Australian Government, “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement,” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-leaders-joint-statement>.

⁴⁴ Australian Government, “Quad Statement of Principles on Clean Energy Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific,” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-statement-principles-clean-energy-supply-chains-indo-pacific>.

moving independently toward greater geoeconomic cooperation without the Quad minilateral necessarily adding value to this process already underway.

Still, Japan and Australia have been active in less high-profile minilateral arrangements, including ones directed at address the issue of deepening economic asymmetries and dependencies around the region. A notable example in this regard has been trilateral infrastructure cooperation between Japan, Australia, and the US. To date, this has focused especially on the Pacific Islands region, a move which reflects the growing geoeconomic challenge posed by China in this part of the world.⁴⁵ In 2018, together with the US, they established the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific which was meant to “deliver major new infrastructure projects, enhance digital connectivity and energy infrastructure, and to achieve other shared development priorities in the Indo-Pacific.”⁴⁶ The subsequent Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership (TIP) would later be used as a vehicle to fund the construction of an undersea telecommunications link connected to Palau.⁴⁷ The memorandum underpinning the TIP was renewed in October 2022 and included commitments to engage with IPEF and the Quad, thus bringing India into a closer relationship in terms of regional infrastructure development.⁴⁸ The TIP was also used in 2022 to support the acquisition of Digicel Pacific, a telecommunications provider in the Pacific Islands region, by Telstra, an Australian telecommunications company.⁴⁹

Other options for minilateral geoeconomic cooperation are also emerging. Indeed, some of these areas of cooperation suggest that further innovation in minilateralism may appear. This is especially the case in terms of what might be called “hybrid minilateralism,” which brings together regional multilateral entities such as ASEAN with one or two secondary powers in the region, such as Japan and Australia, without necessarily bringing other major powers on board (e.g. the US or China). The appeal of hybrid minilateralism is

⁴⁵ For example, see Denghua Zhang, “China’s Influence as a Pacific Donor,” *Interpreter*, October 31, 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-influence-pacific-donor>.

⁴⁶ White House, “Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States of America, Australia, and Japan,” November 17, 2018, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-governments-united-states-america-australia-japan/>. See also H.D.P. Envall, “The Pacific Islands in Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: From ‘Slow and Steady’ to Strategic Engagement?” *Security Challenges* 16, no. 1 (2020): 65–77.

⁴⁷ On the TIP, see Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, “Australia Partnering with Japan and the United States to Finance Palau Undersea Cable,” October 28, 2020, <https://www.aifp.gov.au/news/australia-partnering-japan-and-united-states-finance-palau-undersea-cable>.

⁴⁸ Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement by the United States, Japan, and Australia on the Renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership,” October 17, 2022, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/joint-statement-united-states-japan-and-australia-renewal-trilateral-infrastructure-partnership>.

⁴⁹ Australian Government, “Joint Statement,” November 15, 2022, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/cooperation-telecommunications-financing>.

that it offers some of the practical benefits of more bespoke minilateral arrangements with the broader impact of engaging with a regional multilateral entity. Where ASEAN is concerned, it also allows external actors such as Japan and Australia to maintain adherence to “ASEAN centrality” while also pursuing these more practical opportunities, especially if “opt-in” arrangements in such agreements might reduce the effect of lowest-common-denominator agreements when all ASEAN parties are involved. In October 2021, Australia and ASEAN determined to set up a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the aim being to fund important projects through a Futures Initiative.⁵⁰ The following year, in October 2022, Australia and Japan announced that they would work closely with ASEAN, as well as with the Pacific Islands Forum, the premier multilateral institution in the Pacific Islands region, to increase “regional resilience” across a range of potential areas of cooperation, including energy transition, supply-chain security, and climate change.⁵¹

It is important to note that these kinds of initiatives remain in their early stages of development and are progressing slowly. Further, they are modest in their ambitions. The Futures Initiative underpinning the Australia-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was only completed in June 2022.⁵² The limited results thus far in part reflect some of the challenges of traditional multilateralism, especially with regard to ASEAN and its cumbersome approach to consensus-seeking. It also highlights the failure of Australia over a long period of time to engage more meaningfully in Southeast Asia. This is in contrast to Japan’s engagement with ASEAN over long period based on the principles set out in the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. Japan now has a long history of leading foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia, even as Australian investment into the region has lagged behind.⁵³

A narrower form of minilateral initiative would be for Australia and Japan to engage with the countries of Southeast Asia in a more targeted fashion and thereby create more classic forms of minilateralism. This might happen, for instance, by seeking to develop new minilateral relationships with influential regional actors, especially Indonesia.

In fact, both Australia and Japan have been looking to boost their bilateral

⁵⁰ Australian Mission to ASEAN, “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” n.d., accessed October 22, 2023, <https://asean.mission.gov.au/aesn/CSP.html>.

⁵¹ Australian Government, “Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” October 22, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100410299.pdf>

⁵² ASEAN, “ASEAN, Australia sign Memorandum of Understanding of Australia for ASEAN Futures Initiative,” June 20, 2022, <https://asean.org/asean-australia-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-of-australia-for-asean-future-initiatives/>.

⁵³ On the Fukuda Doctrine, see H.D.P. Envall, *Japanese Diplomacy: The Role of Leadership* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 76–77. For more on Australia and Japan in Southeast Asia, see Envall, “How Australia Can Work with Japan in the Indo-Pacific,” 8–9.

engagements with Indonesia. In February 2023, Australia and Indonesia announced their commitment to enhance bilateral cooperation across a range of areas, including infrastructure, development, and the clean energy transition, as well as trade and investment.⁵⁴ Likewise, in March 2023, Japanese and Indonesian officials also sought to promote further economic cooperation, notably with a view to build new infrastructure (e.g. the Mass Rapid Transit system in Jakarta, Indonesia), and for the two countries to work together on the Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) idea.⁵⁵

The challenge facing both Japan and Australia in these endeavors is that they are already subject to considerable competition from China. This is the case notably in investment to Indonesia since the Covid-19 pandemic, with both countries struggling to compete with Chinese trade and investment. Previously, Australia has characterized Indonesia as a “challenging market overall from a policy and regulatory perspective.”⁵⁶ There is now a greater sense of urgency, however, especially in Australia. In 2023, Australia released a major report on how to boost the country’s engagement of Southeast Asia in the coming decades.⁵⁷

Indonesia clearly presents opportunities for greater engagement—the country remains long short of required investment in order to maintain robust economic growth, with challenges particularly in the infrastructure realm. A key question, then, is whether these bilateral arrangements might be usefully broadened to benefit from minilateralism’s force-multiplier effect, either as a trilateral partnership or even as a larger grouping involving other actors from Southeast Asia. Certainly, new minilateral arrangements involving Indonesia and perhaps other countries offer potential value across a range of geoeconomic areas, including infrastructure, mining, chemicals, and natural gas, for example. They would also align with Japanese and Australian economic strengths and could offer viable “countervailing opportunities” to assist Indonesia in diversifying its economic relationships and building its strategic resiliency.

In fact, there are opportunities across the wider region for boosting economic

⁵⁴ Australian Government, “Joint Statement on the Eighth Australia-Indonesia Foreign and Defence Ministers’ 2+2 Meeting,” February 10, 2023, <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-statement-eighth-australia-indonesia-foreign-and-defence-ministers-22-meeting>.

⁵⁵ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-Indonesia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Japan-Indonesia Ministerial-Level Strategic Dialogue),” March 6, 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000386.html.

⁵⁶ Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *A Blueprint for Trade and Investment with Indonesia* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2021), 48.

⁵⁷ Nicholas Moore, *Invested: Australia Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2023).

resilience in the face of attempts at economic coercion; other secondary states are actively pursuing more security in areas such critical minerals, semiconductors, cyber, and clean energy, amongst others. This suggests considerable scope for Japan and Australia to work together to link these initiatives in different ways, whether to new minilateral initiatives or, indeed, to existing frameworks in the form of Quad+ or other additive arrangements. This could include agreements to expand cooperation on critical minerals, such as the one the two countries signed in late 2022.⁵⁸ Indeed, through the Quad, Japan and Australia have set out some key principles intended to set standards for the development of “critical and emerging technologies,” including the role of industry, the views of multiple stakeholders, and the importance of transparency and inclusiveness.⁵⁹

Conclusion

The trade tensions that both Japan and, more recently, Australia have experienced with China demonstrate the importance of improving resiliency against attempts at economic coercion. It shows how important it is for countries such as Japan and Australia to diversify their economic relationships so as to avoid excessive dependence on single economic actors. It also highlights the need for countries to protect critical areas of their economies, including for instance supply-chain security. More broadly, China’s growing dominance of the regional economy is challenging for Japan and Australia, since their respective national interests are tied to their ability to gain reasonable access to a transparent and fair global investment and trading system. The rise of geoeconomic statecraft in the region—either to gain short-term diplomatic wins or to create and exploit longer-term economic asymmetries for strategic purposes—has concentrated the minds of officials in both countries as they seek ways to build greater resiliency.

The appeal of minilateralism to secondary powers such as Japan and Australia, therefore, comes from the many advantages it offers over both bilateral and multilateral arrangements to meet these challenges. These advantages include minilateralism’s functionality and adaptability when compared to multilateralism and its “force multiplier” effect when compared to bilateralism. This is why minilateralism has come to be viewed as the “way to get things done” in the Indo-Pacific in the face of growing geopolitical and

⁵⁸ Madeleine King, “Australia-Japan Strengthen Critical Minerals Cooperation,” joint media release with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, October 22, 2022, <https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/king/media-releases/australia-japan-strengthen-critical-minerals-cooperation>.

⁵⁹ Australian Government, “Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards,” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-principles-critical-and-emerging-technology-standards>.

geoeconomic rivalry. Indeed, it suggests that, in the coming years, Japan and Australia will be actively seeking not only to deepen their current minilateral arrangements but also to explore new opportunities. Already established fora, such as the Quad, are likely to persist, notwithstanding some of their limitations. But unmet need for minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific suggests that new arrangements are also likely to appear, even if experimentation leads to false institutional starts and agreements that rise and fall quickly. Some of these minilateral agreements may follow an orthodox path of three to six like-minded states coming together to pursue shared interests in a specified area. Certainly, Japan and Australia have a key advantage in forming such arrangements given that they can exploit their own solid partnership as a “building block.” But other more innovative initiatives may also be possible, especially given that both Japan and Australia have deep relations with ASEAN and could thus pursue new forms of “hybrid minilateralism” via ASEAN-based linkups. Overall, the region seems ripe for the emergence of new minilateral “webs” of cooperation in the nexus between economics and security, with Japan and Australia likely to be active players.

This paper was written with the generous support of the Australia-Japan Foundation.

Dr Envall is a Fellow / Senior Lecturer in the Department of International, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University, and an Honorary Associate at La Trobe University.

Bibliography

- Abe, Shinzō. “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI).” Nairobi, Kenya, August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
- Abe, Shinzo. “The Future of Asia: Be Innovative.” Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia,” May 21, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html.
- Aso, Taro. “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons.” Speech on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar, November 30, 2006, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). “ASEAN, Australia sign Memorandum of Understanding of Australia for ASEAN Futures Initiative.” June 20, 2022, <https://asean.org/asean-australia-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-of-australia-for-asean-future-initiatives/>.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). *A Blueprint for Trade and Investment with Indonesia*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2021.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). “Joint Statement by the United States, Japan, and Australia on the Renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership.” October 17, 2022, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/joint-statement-united-states-japan-and-australia-renewal-trilateral-infrastructure-partnership>.
- Australian Government. “Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.” October 22, 2022, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100410299.pdf>
- Australian Government. “Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices.” June 8, 2023, <https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/media-release/joint-declaration-against-trade-related-economic-coercion-and-non-market-policies-and-practices>.
- Australian Government. “Joint Statement.” November 15, 2022, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/cooperation-telecommunications-financing>.
- Australian Government. “Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement.” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/quad-leaders-joint-statement>.
- Australian Government. “Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards.” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-principles-critical-and-emerging-technology-standards>.
- Australian Government. “Quad Statement of Principles on Clean Energy Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific.” May 20, 2023, <https://www.pmc.gov.au/resources/quad-statement-principles-clean-energy-supply-chains-indo-pacific>.
- Australian Government. *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Opportunity, Security, Strength*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017.
- “Australia has Faced Down China’s Trade Bans and Emerged Stronger.” *Economist*, May 23, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/05/23/australia-has-faced-down-chinas-trade-bans-and-emerged-stronger>.
- Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific. “Australia Partnering with Japan and the United States to Finance Palau Undersea Cable.” October 28, 2020, <https://www.aiffp.gov.au/news/australia-partnering-japan-and-united-states-finance-palau-undersea-cable>.
- Australian Mission to ASEAN. “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” N.d. Accessed October 22, 2023, <https://asean.mission.gov.au/aesn/CSP.html>.

- Blackwill, Robert D. and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- “Can Australia Break China’s Monopoly on Critical Minerals?” *Economist*, June 20, 2023, <https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/06/20/can-australia-break-chinas-monopoly-on-critical-minerals>.
- Cha, Victor D. “The Dilemma of Regional Security in East Asia: Multilateralism Versus Bilateralism,” in *Regional Conflict Management*, edited by Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold, 104–22. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
- Cha, Victor. “How to Stop Chinese Coercion: The Case for Collective Resilience.” *Foreign Affairs* 102, no. 1 (2023): 89–101.
- Emanuel, Rahm. “An Anti-Coercion Coalition.” March 27, 2023, <https://jp.usembassy.gov/anti-coercion-coalition-ambassador-rahm-emanuel/>.
- Envall, H.D.P. “Clashing Expectations: Strategic Thinking and Alliance Mismanagement in Japan.” In *United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific: Perspectives from Asia*, edited by Yoichiro Sato and Tan See Seng, 61–88. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2015.
- Envall, H.D.P. “Community Building in Asia? Trilateral Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.” In *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*, edited by Yuki Tatsumi, 51–59. Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015.
- Envall, H.D.P. “How Australia Can Work with Japan in the Indo-Pacific.” Research Paper, Griffith Asia Institute, 2022, https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/1491837/Envall-Australia-Japan_IndoPacific-web.pdf.
- Envall, H.D.P. “Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally.” In *Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, edited by Michael Wesley, 15–30. Canberra: ANU Press, 2017.
- Envall, H.D.P. “Japan’s ‘Pivot’ Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance.” *Security Challenges* 12, no. 3 (2016): 5–19.
- Envall, H.D.P. “South China Sea Perspectives: Japan.” Parliamentary Library Research Paper, Parliament of Australia, October 7, 2022, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2223/SouthChinaSeaPerspectivesJapan#_ftn1
- Envall, H.D.P. “The ‘Abe Doctrine’: Japan’s New Regional Realism.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 20, no. 1 (2020): 31–59.
- Envall, H.D.P. “The Pacific Islands in Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’: From ‘Slow and Steady’ to Strategic Engagement?” *Security Challenges* 16, no. 1 (2020): 65–77.
- Envall, H.D.P. “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards an Indo-Pacific Order?” Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, September 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep20011.1.pdf>.
- Envall, H.D.P. “What Kind of Japan? Tokyo’s Strategic Options in a Contested Asia.” *Survival* 61, no. 4 (2019): 117–30.
- Envall, H.D.P. and Kiichi Fujiwara, “Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge: Discovering the Limits of Middle-Power Internationalism and ‘Strategic Convergence’.” In *Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia Pacific Region*, edited by William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten, 60–76. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.
- Envall, H.D.P. and Thomas S. Wilkins. “Japan and Australia: Forging an Indo-Pacific Partnership.” In *Handbook of Japanese Security*, edited by Leszek Buszynski, 384–99. Tokyo: MHM Limited, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, forthcoming

- 2023.
- Envall, H.D.P. and Thomas S. Wilkins. "Japan and the New Indo-Pacific Order: The Rise of an Entrepreneurial Power." *Pacific Review* 36, no. 4 (2023): 691–722.
- Envall, H.D.P. *Japanese Diplomacy: The Role of Leadership*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015.
- Ferguson, Victor and Derren J. Lim, "Economic Power and Vulnerability in Sino-Australian Relations." In *China Story Yearbook: Crisis*, edited by Jane Golley, Linda Jaivin, and Sharon Strange, 259–74. Canberra: ANU Press, 2021.
- Foot, Rosemary and Amy King. "Assessing the Deterioration in China–U.S. Relations: U.S. Governmental Perspectives on the Economic-Security Nexus." *China International Strategic Review* 1 (2019): 39–50.
- "Friends and Neighbours." *Economist*, November 20, 2010, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2010/11/20/friends-and-neighbours>.
- Goldstein, Avery and Edward D. Mansfield, "The Political Economy of Regional Security in East Asia." In *The Nexus of Economics, Security, and International Relations in East Asia*, edited by Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, 1–38. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Green, Michael J. "Strategic Asian Triangles," in *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, edited by Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 758–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- He, Kai. "Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the 'Indo-Pacific' from an IR Theory Perspective." *East Asia* 35, no. 2 (2018): 149–61.
- Hunter, Fergus, Daria Impiombato, Yvonne Lau, and Adam Triggs. "Countering China's Coercive Diplomacy: Prioritizing Economic Security, Sovereignty and the Rules-Based Order." Policy Brief, Report no. 68/2023. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023.
- Jones, David M. and Michael L. Smith. "Making Process, not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order." *International Security* 32, no. 1, (2007): 148–184.
- Kahler, Miles. "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers." *International Organization* 46, no. 3 (1992): 681–708.
- Kim, Tongfi. "Asia's Minilateral Moment." *Diplomat*, June 12, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/asias-minilateral-moment>.
- King, Madeleine. "Australia-Japan Strengthen Critical Minerals Cooperation." Joint media release with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, October 22, 2022, <https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/king/media-releases/australia-japan-strengthen-critical-minerals-cooperation>.
- Koga, Kei. "A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 27–34.
- Laksmana, Evan A. "Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?" *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 35–42.
- Lee-Brown, Troy. "Asia's Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." *East Asia* 35 (2018): 163–76.
- McGregor, Richard. "Chinese Coercion, Australian Resilience." Lowy Institute Analysis, October 2022.
- Medcalf, Rory. *Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won't Map the Future*. Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2020.
- Mochizuki, Mike. "Tokyo's Taiwan Conundrum: What Can Japan Do to Prevent War?" *Washington Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2022): 81–107.
- Moore, Nicholas. *Invested: Australia Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040*. Canberra:

- Commonwealth of Australia, 2023.
- Nilsson-Wright, John. "Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Opportunities for Security Convergence and Cooperation between Australia, India and Japan." Chatham House Research Paper (Lond: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017).
- O'Neil, Andrew and Lucy West. "The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Indo-Pacific Minilateralism: Resurrection without Renewal?" In *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, edited by Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo, 27–41. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Pan, Chengxin. "The 'Indo-Pacific' and Geopolitical Anxieties about China's Rise in the Asian Regional Order." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68, no. 4 (2014): 453–69.
- Pempel, T.J., ed. *The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Ravenhill, John. "Entrepreneurial States: A Conceptual Overview." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 73, no. 4 (2018): 501–17.
- Satake, Tomohiko. "The Rise of 'Minilateralism' in the Indo-Pacific: The Quad & AUKUS." *Japan Spotlight*, March/April 2023, 29–32, https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/248th_Cover_Story_04.pdf.
- Saunders, Phillip C. "China's Role in Asia: Attractive or Aggressive?" In *International Relations of Asia*. 3rd ed., edited by David Shambaugh, 115–38. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022.
- Singh, Bhubhindar and Sarah Teo. "Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific." In *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, edited by Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo, 1–12. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Sohn, Yul and T.J. Pempel, eds. *Japan and Asia's Contested Order: The Interplay of Security, Economics, and Identity*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Stevenson, Kate and H.D.P. Envall. "The 'Quad' and Disaster Management: An Australian Perspective." In *International Disaster Response: Rebuilding the Quad?* Edited by Yuki Tatsumi and Jason Li, 13–23. Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2019.
- Suzuki, Shogo and Corey Wallace, "Explaining Japan's Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability." *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (2018): 711–34.
- Tarapore, Arzan and Brendan Taylor, "Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus." *Asia Policy* 17, no. 4 (2022): 2–7.
- Taylor, Brendan. "Navigating the Strange Minilateraliverse of Madness." *Interpreter*, May 18, 2023, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/navigating-strange-minilateraliverse-madness>.
- Tow, William T. "Minilateral Security's Relevance to US Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Prospects." *Pacific Review* 32, no. 2 (2019): 232–44.
- Tow, William T. "Minilateralism and US Security Policy in the Indo-Pacific: The Legacy, Viability and Deficiencies of a New Security Approach." In *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN*, edited by Bhubhindar Singh and Sarah Teo, 13–26. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Tow, William T. "The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Minilateralism, and Asia-Pacific Order Building." In *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*, edited by Yuki Tatsumi, 23–35. Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2015.
- Tow, William T. and Brendan Taylor. "What is Asian Security Architecture?" *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 95–116.

- Tow, William T. and H.D.P. Envall. "The U.S. and Implementing Multilateral Security in the Pacific: Can Convergent Security Work?" *IFANS Review* 19, no. 2 (2011): 49–72.
- White House. "Joint Statement of the Governments of the United States of America, Australia, and Japan." November 17, 2018, <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-governments-united-states-america-australia-japan/>.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "After a Decade of Strategic Partnership: Japan and Australia 'Decentering' from the US Alliance?" *Pacific Review* 31, no. 4 (2018): 498–514.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "Elevating the Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership to 'a New Level': Challenges and Responses." *JIIA Policy Brief*, April 13, 2021.
- Wilkins, Thomas S. "The 'Minilateral Moment' and the Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific." *NIDS Commentary* 254, February 16, 2023, <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary254e.pdf>.
- Wilkins, Thomas. "Australia, Japan and the Revival of Indo-Pacific Minilateralism." Roundtable presentation made at the Australia-Japan Foundation "Enhancing Australia-Japan Cooperation: New Approaches to Minilateralism" Workshop, March 2, 2023, Canberra, Australian National University.
- Wilkins, Thomas. "The Quad and AUKUS Strengthen Australia's Hand in a Contested Indo-Pacific," *Strategist*, June 1, 2022, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-quad-and-aukus-strengthen-australias-hand-in-a-contested-indo-pacific/>.
- Wilson, Jeffrey. "Australia Shows the World What Decoupling from China Looks Like." *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/09/australia-china-decoupling-trade-sanctions-coronavirus-geopolitics/>.
- Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. "Economic-Security Linkages in Asia." In *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*, edited by Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, 569–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. *Japan's Asian Diplomacy: Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
- Zhang, Denghua. "China's Influence as a Pacific Donor." *Interpreter*, October 31, 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-influence-pacific-donor>.