Japan’s American Alliance: Forgoing Autonomy for Deterrence

 

H. D. P. Envall

2023

 

Author: HDP Envall
Publication year: 2023
Publication type: book chapter

Envall, H.D.P. (2023) “Japan’s American Alliance: Forgoing Autonomy for Deterrence,” in Simon Avenell (ed.) Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook, Tokyo: MHM Limited, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 261–75.


Japan’s alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country’s security policy. Indeed, the alliance has long delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, such as greater deterrence of regional security threats. Yet the alliance has also come with costs. It has institutionalized Tokyo’s dependence on Washington, thus limiting the country’s strategic autonomy. This chapter examines how Japan has sought to manage the task of reconciling such tensions between the often-conflicting goals of deterrence and autonomy. It argues that, while Japan has pursued autonomy where possible, it has repeatedly prioritized deterrence as the country’s primary national security goal.

Introduction

No country in the world today is in a position to defend itself unaided against aggression.
Yoshida Shigeru, 19611

Japan’s alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of the country’s defense seventy years after the original security treaty was signed by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru in September 1951. Why has Japan clung so close to the United States? The alliance has always delivered Japan considerable strategic advantages, notably a security guarantee and an opportunity to “underproduce” on defense.2 But there have also been costs. It has left Japan with a perpetual fear of either abandonment by the US or entrapment in US policies and institutionalized in Tokyo a high level of strategic dependence on Washington. For international relations theory, Japan’s partnership with the US therefore raises some fundamental questions of alliance management. When managing alliances, how do states weigh up different costs and benefits and reconcile competing and sometimes contradictory national objectives?

In examining the history of Japan’s alliance management, this chapter focuses on the challenges Japan has faced in reconciling in its commitment to two, at times competing, national strategic objectives: the pursuit of autonomy and deterrence. Autonomy—the capacity to act freely in international affairs—is often viewed as a key national policy goal, along with status and prestige, and has been widely examined in relation to Japan.3 Deterrence is widely seen as a core justification for alliances. Where states seek to balance against or deter perceived threats, they have two choices: to do so internally (via military buildups) or externally (by forming alliances).4 Once an alliance is formed, allies must continue to address an autonomy/deterrence dilemma. For a junior ally especially, pushing too hard for autonomy may risk abandonment by the senior partner to the threats posed by adversaries while pushing too hard for deterrence may risk entrapment in the senior partner’s separate disputes.5

This chapter seeks to trace the evolution of Japan’s responses to the autonomy/deterrence dilemma over the history of the US-Japan alliance. This history is divided into four periods, each of which entailed various forms of the autonomy/deterrence dilemma: from Occupation to the security treaty crisis; from the Nixon “shocks” to the end of the Cold War; from the Gulf War to the War on Terror; and since the rise of China. The chapter argues that, through the history of the US-Japan alliance, Japan has repeatedly forgone autonomy in order to fortify deterrence. That this has happened does not fit easily with many past understandings of Japanese policymaking—that it has been incoherent or absent.6 Japan’s alliance history, however, supports those who argue that Japan has consistently been pragmatic in its strategic thinking, attuned to fluctuations in power and capable of fine calculations of its strategic interest? At the same time, it also raises questions about the direction of this pragmatism and attention to power, especially in terms of the view that Japan would increasingly prioritize autonomy in the post–Cold War period. Samuels, for instance, has argued that Japan was moving toward a new “Goldilocks consensus” on security where it would find a balance between autonomy and national strength or deterrence, and between the US and China.8 This briefly appeared likely around 2009–2010. In the face of a more threatening region of the past decade, however, Japan has returned to its traditional prioritization of deterrence.9 In this less secure environment, the appeal of increased autonomy (though not of increased capabilities) has shrunk significantly.

Cold War compromise to treaty crisis

Japan’s strategic circumstances were fundamentally changed by the country’s defeat in World War II. Occupation by the US and its allies meant that Tokyo could not immediately reestablish the nation as an independent player in world affairs. Though far from independent, Japan nonetheless faced a challenging strategic environment characterized by great power rivalry between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other. In response to Japan’s weak position, Yoshida adopted a strategy that would involve a “grand bargain” with the US while also finding a balance in Japan’s turbulent domestic politics of the time—between conservatives who pushed for greater autonomy through rearmament and progressives who sought autonomy through a policy of unarmed neutrality. Instead, Yoshida opted for deterrence with dependence.10 In what eventually came to be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan agreed to a subordinate position to the US in the new international order, and so traded greater autonomy in the Cold War for increased deterrence via an alliance with the US, the quid pro quo being that Japan would agree to host American military bases.11

The final major benefit of the alliance was the opportunity it provided to underproduce on defense. Yoshida used Article 9, the so-called “peace clause” in Japan’s new constitution, to blunt requests from the US for a rapid rearmament.12 As Yoshida later wrote, rearmament verged on “idiocy.” For a country in its economic situation, “to attempt anything which could be considered as rearmament” was “completely out of the question.”13 Accordingly, Japan rearmed only slowly over the next two decades. As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, spending on defense fell from 1.78 percent in 1955 to below 1 percent by 1967.14 In 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo would announce that Japan’s defense spending would be limited to this 1 percent figure.15

Yet, as noted, the costs to Japan’s strategic autonomy were substantial. This new alignment with the US further complicated Japan’s already messy relations with the region—a legacy of its prewar and wartime conduct around the region. It undermined Japan’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China during the 1950s. Indeed, Tokyo’s failure to negotiate a peace treaty with Moscow would undermine Soviet-Japanese relations for much of the Cold War.16 Similarly, Tokyo’s autonomy when dealing with Beijing was also heavily constrained.17 This was in fact well understood by Yoshida. He noted, for instance, that Japan would remain in a “state of weakness” if it continued depending on the American security guarantee for too long.18

On the right of Japanese politics, the criticism of Yoshida was much stronger. Subsequent prime ministers such as Kishi Nobusuke and Hatoyama Ichirō saw this heavy dependence on America as humiliating and argued strongly for rearmament. Kishi had contended that “it is not the policy of an independent nation to have troops of a foreign country based on its soil,”19 while Hatoyama, upon becoming prime minister, talked of a major goal for Japan being “‘to achieve complete independence’—in other words, the diplomatic and military independence of Japan.”20 A key aim for the revisionists was to achieve a more “autonomous defense” (jishu bōei) posture for Japan.21

Yet the revisionists were to be frustrated in their attempts to achieve greater autonomy. On rearmament, their hands had already been tied by budget preparations in 1953–1954 that reflected Yoshida’s viewpoint. By the time Hatoyama gained power, Japan’s military-industrial complex, the major potential driver of rearmament, had largely been hollowed out.22 Planning for constitutional revision moved slowly; revision was, in any case, blocked by anti-revision opposition parties after 1955.23 This essentially left the US-Japan alliance as the major leftover area for change. When Kishi became prime minister in 1957, he argued that “it is now time to fundamentally review the security treaty.”24 However, Kishi’s approach to the security treaty represents an important shift in how Japanese policymakers viewed the autonomy/deterrence dilemma. The objective now was not greater autonomy but greater equality within the alliance framework.

Bilateral negotiations over the new security treaty, which largely took place through 1958-1959 were complex but mostly progressed smoothly. In January 1960, Kishi was able to visit Washington to sign the final document, with the trip receiving wide media coverage.25 Ratification, by contrast, would lead to a major crisis in Japanese politics and US-Japan relations and cost Kishi his prime ministership. By the time of final ratification, Japan was beset by mass protests and violence. Finally, when the necessary legislation was passed and the instruments of ratification exchanged in late June 1960, Kishi resigned as prime minister.26 Japan had achieved greater equality in the alliance, but revisionist ambitions—on rearmament, constitutional revision and further autonomy—had been widely discredited.

After the Nixon “shocks”

Japan’s strategic circumstances began to move once again in the second half of the 1960s. The region became more threatening for Japan in 1964 when China tested its first nuclear weapon.27 Although Prime Minister Satō Eisaku had been open to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, he eventually pushed Japan down the non-nuclear path, setting out Japan three non-nuclear principles (prohibiting Japan from making nuclear weapons, possessing them or allowing them into the country) in December 1967 and its Four Pillars Nuclear Policy in January 1968.28 By instituting these policies, Satō was effectively closing off the option of Japan becoming an autonomous nuclear actor. Instead, the country would again achieve deterrence at a reasonable cost by ceding nuclear autonomy to the US, even if this came at the expense of constant fears about the credibility of the American nuclear commitment.

The more significant challenge for Japan on the autonomy/deterrence dilemma, however, was to come at the end of the decade with the strategic “shocks” (shokku) set off by US President Richard Nixon.29 There were three of these shokku. First, in July 1969, Nixon announced the broad parameters of what would become the Guam or Nixon Doctrine. While the US would maintain its treaty commitments and provide extended nuclear deterrence to allies and partners, it would look to these countries to take up “primary responsibility” for their own defense. Second, in July 1971, Nixon announced that he would visit China to meet with Mao Zedong and seek to normalize America’s diplomatic relations with China.30 Finally, in August 1971, Nixon announced a new set of policies intended to boost the US economy. Including an import tariff, wage and price controls and an end to the US dollar’s convertibility to gold, this third shock had a significant impact on the Japanese economy.31

For Japan, these shocks reset the dynamics of the autonomy/deterrence dilemma, offering new opportunities for greater autonomy but also increased concerns around the deterrence value of the alliance. Certainly, the shocks prompted Japanese revisionists to revisit the autonomy issue. The new Director General of the Japan Defense Agency Nakasone Yasuhiro, a revisionist from the right of the LDP, sought to boost Japan’s defense capabilities and give the country a more significant role in the alliance.32 Nakasone’s “autonomous defense” vision maintained much of the status quo but put more responsibility on Japan to take up the primary role in the nation’s defense, thus pushing the alliance into a secondary role.33 It would, moreover, entail a doubling of defense spending.34 Nakasone’s ideas, however, proved far too controversial. Domestically, they were not well supported within the LDP or key parts of the bureaucracy, let alone Japan’s opposition parties and the wider public.35 Internationally, China was opposed to increases in Japanese military spending, while the US was also concerned about the apparent downgrading of the alliance to a secondary role. The normalization of Sino-American relations would also weaken the rationale for increased defense spending based on a “China threat.”36

Instead, Japan gradually moved toward a more modest reform of defense strategy. This approach was exemplified by the “basic defense force concept” (kibanteki bōeiryoku kōsō) developed by JDA Vice Minister Kubo Takuya. Kubo’s basic defense strategy was a recalculation of the post-Nixon autonomy/deterrence dilemma. Once again, however, Tokyo determined that autonomy beyond basic self-defense added little to Japanese security, which could largely be achieved through the alliance. Indeed, rapid militarization could upset the strategic balance and thus weaken Japanese security.37 The price of this moderation, however, would be continued dependence.

But continued dependence did not mean that Japan would continue to play the same role in the alliance. The logic of the Guam Doctrine was still for Japan to do more. This remained an expectation of the US; it was also a Japanese goal, as a way to keep the US engaged in Asia. Indeed, growing regional threats, especially from the late 1970s, made Japanese policymakers more wary of abandonment than they were of entrapment, leading to a period of enhanced cooperation with a view to clarifying the alliance’s “division of labor.”38 The result was the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.39 Japan became gradually more capable but not necessarily more autonomous. As Satake argues, Tokyo was seeking to “tighten” the alliance in order to boost its deterrence capacity by enmeshing the US more credibly in regional security.”40 Growing capabilities would also be a feature of Japan’s alliance management through the 1980s, especially when Nakasone became prime minister. His major goal now was to push Japan’s defense spending above the 1 percent limit set in the 1970s, an objective he achieved, albeit only by a “symbolic” 0.004 percent.41 However, Nakasone’s efforts were not especially addressed at achieving greater autonomy. Instead, he sought to give Japan a greater role within the alliance and on Western security debates more generally. Japan would be America’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and its security interests would be “indivisible” from those of the US and Europe.42

From Gulf War to War on Terror

By the end of the Cold War, growing Japanese economic power, coupled with apparent American decline, meant that some saw the world as moving “toward a Pax Nipponica.”43 In Japan, figures such as Ishihara Shintaro, a nationalist politician, talked of Japan as a “high-tech superpower” and suggested the country now had the “power to say no” to the US.44 Yet Japan’s autonomy remained tightly constrained, a reality exposed by its response to the Gulf War in 1991 and key developments in Asian security through the 1990s.

Concerning the Gulf War, Tokyo’s failure to do much more beyond financial contributions—although these were substantial, amounting to approximately US$14 billion—meant that it was criticized by the US for its “checkbook diplomacy.”45 The government of Kaifu Toshiki had, in fact, attempted to do much more in support of the war effort. But for a range of reasons, the government found itself unable to deliver on these promises.46 It was only in June 1992, well after the war, that it was able to pass new legislation to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to engage in limited peacekeeping activities.47 The peacekeeping initiative emerged from a debate that followed the Gulf War failure on how Japan might become a more “normal nation” (futsū no kuni) and play a more active role in international affairs. It was an example of this decade’s liberal internationalism and the idea that Japan be more active through engagement with multilateral institutions, particularly the UN.48 This thinking was also prompted by moves in America to draw down US involvement in the Asia-Pacific and thus realize the “peace dividend” delivered by the end of the Cold War.49 Accordingly, the Japanese government established an Advisory Group on Defense Issues (The Higuchi Committee), which argued that Japan needed to “play an active role in shaping a new order.”50 The committee emphasized multilateralism and non-military commitments as a means to boost Japan’s prominence.

On Asian security in the 1990s, it soon became clear that there would be little in the way of a peace dividend and that any policy based on international institutions would also come with limitations. First, in Northeast Asia, even as the Soviet Union had collapsed, North Korea became a clear security threat following the nuclear crisis of 1993–1994 and even more so after it launched a missile over Japanese territory in 1998.51 Similarly, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 exposed the limitations of the alliance coordination as set up in the 1970s. Second, the alliance itself endured a period of crisis. The two sides were at odds over trade, and mutual confidence in the alliance itself was severely tested by the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl by US military personnel in Okinawa.52 Rather than drift further apart, however, the two countries engaged in a period of reform from the mid-1990s leading to new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 1997.53 Lastly, the limitations of Japan’s multilateralism were revealed by the 1998 nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. As a country devastated by the atomic bombings of World War II, Japan reacted negatively to these tests and pushed for a strong international response. Yet it received only lukewarm support in the UN Security Council, even from the United States.54 The limitations of diplomatic autonomy based on liberal internationalism had been exposed by the new realities of post -Cold War Asia.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US led to another reappraisal of Japan’s security posture. In particular, the government led by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ ichiro, one of Japan’s most charismatic postwar leaders, reemphasized the alliance as the central pillar of Japan’s security policy.55 Koizumi’s intention was to make sure that Japan responded to the War on Terror more effectively than it had to the Gulf War. There would be no repeat of “diplomatic shock” after the Gulf War. Koizumi passed two important pieces of legislation which allowed Japan to support America’s War on Terror—the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of 2001 and the Iraq Special Measures Law of 2003.56 Accordingly, Koizumi had pushed Japan suddenly toward what has been called “de facto collective self-defense.”57 But Koizumi also saw the War on Terror as an opportunity to reshape Japan’s own security posture to make the country, if not more autonomous, at least more capable. He initiated or oversaw a range of security-related reforms, such as giving more status to the Japan Defense Agency within the bureaucracy, marginalizing the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, which had historically interpreted Article 9 to constrain Japan’s security role, and strengthening the role of the prime minister in foreign and security policy.58

The China challenge

Following America’s normalization of relations with China, Japan was able to engage more freely with China, and the relationship was largely positive for the remainder of the Cold War. But this slowly changed in the post–Cold War period, as various tensions, such as territorial disputes, began to disrupt the relationship.59 Perhaps counter-intuitively then, in 2009–2010, China became the focus of another effort by Tokyo to establish some autonomy from the US. A new government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) sought to reposition Japan as a “bridge between China and the us.”60 The logic, espoused most prominently by then Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, was that greater autonomy from the US could be achieved by reducing the role played by the US in Japan’s international relations and instead deepening the country’s engagement with Asia, especially China. Although the US-Japan alliance would remain important, Japan would develop a new strategy following a philosophy of “open regional cooperation” and based on new regional institutions such as the proposed East Asian Community (EAC).61

Hatoyama’s vision for a more autonomous Japan soon fell apart, however. The DPJ mismanaged the relationship with the US, a major source of tension being US bases in Okinawa.62 But the DPJ also failed to explain its thinking on the EAC idea. America’s role was poorly explained, leading to fears in Washington that it was being excluded. Beijing, meanwhile, viewed the proposal as an effort by Tokyo to set up a “Japan-led order” in the Asia-Pacific.63 Even as the DPJ was arguing for a distancing from the US, events in theregion were pushing in the opposite direction. After a Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Japan Coast Guard ship in September 2010, Japan’s relationship with China deteriorated significantly.64 Consequently, Hatoyama’s successors in the DPJ soon returned Japan to the postwar orthodoxy of alliance centrality. The 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines strengthened alliance cooperation, reorganized the JSDF and set out a new “dynamic defense force concept” (dōteki bōeiryoku) to replace the “basic defense force concept” of the 1970s.65

By 2012 it was clear that the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations would not be transient. Rather, a longer term hardening of strategic interests and mutual threat perceptions was now underway, as illustrated by the new diplomatic furor which erupted in 2012 after the DPJ nationalized the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.66 Japan’s strategic vulnerability due to China’s growing assertiveness, the threat posed by North Korea and the unpredictable nature of Asia’s security flashpoints all highlight the continuing deterrence value of the alliance.67 Accordingly, when the LDP returned to government in late 2012, it sought to boost Japan’s military and diplomatic capabilities. But rather than a renewed attempt at autonomy this was, instead, aimed at buttressing the alliance and reducing the risk of abandonment.

Led by Abe Shinzō, the government issued a National Security Strategy and set up a National Security Council. Henceforth, Japan would seek to make a “proactive contribution to peace” in the Asia-Pacific.68 Restrictions on the country’s right to collective self-defense were loosened: under a “reinterpreted” Article 9, Japan could now come to the defense of an ally.69 Tokyo also cooperated closely with Washington to develop new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation in 2015, updating the 1997 Guidelines so that the alliance would be more flexible in responding to Asia’s new security challenges.70 When the US Obama administration sought to “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia, Abe ensured that Japan responded proactively.71 Indeed, Abe argued that Japan’s own security reforms would “complement” the rebalance and that Japan would support US efforts “first, last, and throughout.”72

In fact, Abe also envisaged that Japan would play a much larger and more autonomous diplomatic role in the region. This process had begun in the mid-2000s as Japan began establishing key strategic partnerships around Asia, notably with Australia and India.73 From the mid-2010s, however, Abe began drawing together a more ambitious regional agenda under the banner of the “Free and Open Indo Pacific” (FOIP). The aim of FOIP has been to maintain and strengthen the regional order—now the “Indo-Pacific” connected through the “confluence of the two seas” (futatsu no umi no majiwari).74 Under FOIP, Japan has been seeking to uphold key principles of the “rules-based order,” build regional prosperity and make sure that the region remained peaceful and stable.75 But FOIP, too, has been aimed at maintaining key elements of the US-led regional order, keep the US engaged in the Indo-Pacific and substitute for American weaknesses in the region. Japan has thus been a major actor in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the leading power pushing ahead with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership after America’s withdrawal under President Donald Trump?76 FOIP thus represents Japan’s most determined attempt since World War II to become more autonomous and more engaged in international affairs. Once again, however, the intention has not been to loosen Japan from the alliance but to tighten the alliance linkages and further enmesh the US in the region.

Conclusion

To argue that through alliance history Japan has repeatedly foregone autonomy to prioritize deterrence is not to suggest that this has been accepted universally in Japan. As this chapter has demonstrated, this consensus has been challenged repeatedly during the Cold War and since. It was attempted in the 1950s by revisionists such as Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke and by Nakasone Yasuhiro in the early 1970s.77 But efforts to overturn the status quo also came from liberal internationalists and the political left. The push toward multilateralism after the Gulf War was intended to challenge the primacy of the alliance in Japanese policymaking, as was Hatoyama’s vision of Japan balancing equidistantly between the US and China following the 2008 global financial crisis.78

Nevertheless, prioritization of deterrence over autonomy has endured and, in fact, continuously evolved. Alliance history also demonstrates how revisionists have been repeatedly coopted into this consensus. When negotiating security treaty revisions in the late 1950s, Kishi abandoned notions of drawing down the US military presence in Japan to focus instead on establishing a more equal partnership. Having pushed autonomous defense in the early 1970s, Nakasone argued for a “tighter coupling” with the US in the 1980s?79 Abe Shinzo came to power (twice) as a nationalist and historical revisionist; but he too ultimately deepened Japan’s alliance with America. The key plank of his security reforms, the loosening of restrictions on collective self-defense, makes Japan substantially less autonomous from the US.80

Clearly, different Japanese governments have pursued distinct policies, and the underlying rationale for these decisions has also changed. The Yoshida Doctrine came about when Japan faced significant external and internal challenges with limited capabilities. The alliance offered maximum deterrence at little cost relative to a strategy based on autonomy.81 Kubo’s basic defense policy represented a judgement that potential threats were manageable via the deterrence offered by the alliance and that any significant push for autonomy would be counterproductive.82 The Abe Doctrine, notwithstanding Abe’s personal nationalism, flowed from an assessment that Japan’s strategic environment was becoming substantially more threatening, meaning that Japan required a more robust level of deterrence. Having greater autonomy would not fundamentally address this problem.83

This pattern reveals two striking features of Japan’s alliance management. The first is the consistency in the process through which these decisions came about or what Pyle has called Japan’s “pattern of extraordinary sensitivity to the workings of the international system.”84 Japanese policymakers have demonstrated unwavering attention to a broadly similar array of factors: the intentions as well as capabilities of adversaries; Japan’s own capabilities and the likely effects that changing these would have in terms of regional stability and domestic cohesion; the intentions and capabilities of the US; and the likelihood and risks of abandonment and entrapment in the alliance.85 The second feature, however, is that this consistent sensitivity appears to be leading not toward a balancing of autonomy and deterrence in Japanese policy, as might be expected of the “Goldilocks consensus” imagined by Samuels.86

Instead, the importance of deterrence to Japanese grand strategy, and thus the importance of the alliance, has steadily increased-initially after the Nixon “shocks” of the early 1970s and then again with the rise of China. On the flip side, autonomy has become less of a national strategic goal to be pursued and more a sign of strategic failure to be avoided. In the current environment, a sudden rush toward true autonomy would indicate that Japan had become isolated in the region, including from the US, and would need to take dramatic steps for national self-defense. Thus viewed, Yoshida’s counsel—that no country can defend itself unaided—is more relevant than ever for Japan. Deterrence is fundamental to Japanese security and thus so too is the US-Japan alliance.

Notes

  1. Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis (London: Heinemann, 1961), 195.
  2. Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International
    Security 29, no. I (2005): 92–121.
  3. Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs,
    2007), 55–58, 62–65; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia
    (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 6.
  4. John S. Duffield, “Alliances,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2013), 344.
  5. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 467. On Japan, see H. D. P. Envall, “Underplaying the ‘Okinawa Card’: How Japan Negotiates Its Alliance with the United States,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 4 (2013): 385–86.
  6. Samuels offers the best outline of this debate. See Samuels, Securing Japan, 1–9.
  7. Samuels, Securing Japan, 6; Pyle, Japan Rising, 27.
  8. Samuels, Securing Japan, 9.
  9. Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace, “Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability,” International Affairs 94, no. 4 (2018): 713–18.
  10. H. D. P. Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” in National Perspectives on a Multipolar Order: Interrogating the Global Power Transition, ed. Benjamin Zala (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021), 144–68.
  11. John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954, paperback ed. (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1988); Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996); Soeya Yoshihide, “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Dokutorin,” Kokusai Seiji 151 (2008): 1–17.
  12. Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 206–7.
  13. Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 191–92; Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children, 206.
  14. Samuels, Securing Japan, 41.
  15. Joseph P. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 56–57.
  16. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 114–23.
  17. Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” 150–51.
  18. Cited in Samuels, Securing Japan, 7.
  19. Kishi Nobusuke, “Makoto no dokuritsu Nihon no tame ni,” Fūsei, January 1954, reproduced in Kishi Nobusuke, Kishi Nobusuke kaikoroku: Hoshu gōdō to anpo kaitei (Tokyo: Kōsaidō, 1983), 109. See also Samuels, Securing Japan, 30.
  20. Cited in Masumi Junnosuke, Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955, trans. Lonny E. Carlile (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley), 314.
  21. Samuels, Securing Japan, 30.
  22. Samuels, Securing Japan, 33–34.
  23. Richard Sims, Japanese Political History Since the Meiji Renovation, 1868-2000 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 274–78.
  24. Kishi Nobusuke, Kishi Nobusuke kaikoroku: Hoshu gōdō to anpo kaitei (Tokyo: Kōsaidō Shuppan, 1983), 294.
  25. Schaller, Altered States, 140–42.
  26. Masumi Junnosuke, Contemporary Politics in Japan, trans. Lonny E. Carlile (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995), 38–48.
  27. Shingo Yoshida, “In the Shadow of China’s Bomb: Nuclear Consultation, Commitment Reconfirmation, and Missile Defence in the US-Japan Alliance, 1962-1968,” in Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance, ed. John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (London: Routledge, 2019), 172–73.
  28. Kusunoki Ayako, “The Satō Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Policy,” Journal of American–East Asian Relations 15 (2008): 25–50; Mark Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Adelphi Paper 55, no. 455 (2015): 71–73.
  29. Schaller, Altered States, 210–44.
  30. Fintan Hoey, Satō, America and the Cold War: US–Japan Relations, 1964-72 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 147–48; Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” 151.
  31. Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 344.
  32. Yukinori Komine, Negotiating the U.S.–Japan Alliance: Japan Confidential (London: Routledge, 2017), 165–68.
  33. Yasuhiro Nakasone, The Making of a New Japan: Reclaiming the Political Mainstream, trans. Lesley Connors (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1999), 160.
  34. Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), 38–40; Michael J. Green, “Balance of Power,” in U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World, ed. Steven K. Vogel (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 18.
  35. Komine, Negotiating the U.S.–Japan Alliance, 167.
  36. Hoey, Satō, America and the Cold War, 122–33; Green, “Balance of Power,” 18.
  37. Samuels, Securing Japan, 2–3; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 233–35. See also Kubo Takuya, “Boeiryoku seibi no kangaekata,” February 20, 1971, reproduced in Sekai to Nihon database, ed. Tanaka Akihiko, https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html.
  38. Tomohiko Satake, “The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 29.
  39. Sado Akihiro, The Self-Defense Forces and Postwar Politics in Japan, trans. Noda Makito (Tokyo: Japan Library, 2017), 105–16.
  40. Satake, “The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role,” 29.
  41. Keddell, The Politics of Defense in Japan, 147.
  42. H. D. P. Envall, Japanese Diplomacy: The Role of Leadership (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York, 2015), 153–55, 159.
  43. Ezra F. Vogel, “Pax Nipponica?” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 4 (1986): 767.
  44. Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan that Can Say No: Why Japan will be First Among Equals, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 25, 43. See also Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” 152.
  45. H. D. P. Envall, “Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally,” in Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century, ed. Michael Wesley (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 20.
  46. For example, see Michael J. Green and Igata Akira, “The Gulf War and Japan’s National Security Identity,” in Examining Japans Lost Decades, ed. Yoichi Funabashi and Barak Kushner (London: Routledge, 2015), 161–62.
  47. Katsumi Ishizuka, “Japan’s Policy Towards UN Peacekeeping Operations,” International Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (2005): 69; Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 86–95.
  48. A key figure in this debate was the politician, Ozawa Ichirō. See Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation, trans. Louisa Rubinfien (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994); Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” 153.
  49. Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 23–24.
  50. Advisory Group on Defense Issues, “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan,” August 12, 1994, reproduced in Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program, Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, McNair Paper 31 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1994), 30; Envall, “Clashing Expectations,” 69.
  51. Envall, “Japan,” 20–21.
  52. Koji Murata, “The 1990s: From a Drifting Relationship to a Redefinition of the Alliance,” in The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present, ed. Makoto Iokibe, trans. Tosh Minohara (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 224–28; Edward J. Lincoln, Troubled Times: U.S.-Japan Trade Relations in the 1990s (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 121–34; Envall, “Underplaying the ‘Okinawa Card’,” 386–87.
  53. See, for example, Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
  54. Satu Limaye, “Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 2 (2000): 332–35. See also H. D. P. Envall, “Japan’s India Engagement: From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners,” in The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, ed. Ian Hall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 44–46.
  55. H. D. P. Envall, “Exceptions that Make the Rule? Koizumi Jun’ichiro and Political Leadership in Japan,” Japanese Studies 28, no. 2 (2008): 235–36.
  56. Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy: Japans Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 86–98,113–32.
  57. Samuels, Securing Japan, 94-99; Envall, “Japan,” 21.
  58. H. D. P. Envall, “Transforming Security Politics: Koizumi Jun’ichiro and the Gaullist Tradition in Japan,” Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies 8, no. 2, art. 3 (2008), https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2008/Envall.html; Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy, 63–85.
  59. Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” Foreign Affairs 85, no: 2 (2006): 1–11.
  60. Takashi Yokota, “The Real Yukio Hatoyama; Japan’s New Prime Minister Could Be Asia’s First ‘Third Way’ Leader,” Newsweek, September 28,2009.
  61. Yukio Hatoyama, “Japan’s New Commitment to Asia: Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community,” address by H. E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, November 15, 2009, Singapore, http:/ /japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html. See also Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy Under the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy 12 (2011): 99–129; Envall, “Clashing Expectations,” 71–76.
  62. Tomohito Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 168–79; H. D.P. Envall and Kerri Ng, “The Okinawa ‘Effect’ in US-Japan Alliance Politics,” Asian Security 11, no. 3 (2015): 231–33.
  63. Envall, “Clashing Expectations,” 71–73; Sneider, “The New Asianism,” 112.
  64. Ryo Sahashi, “The DPJ Government’s Failed Foreign Policy: A Case of Politician-Led Government Gone Wrong,” in Looking for Leadership: The Dilemma of Political Leadership in Japan, ed. Ryo Sahashi and James Gannon (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2015), 145–48.
  65. See Japan Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,” December 17, 2010; H. D.P. Envall and Kiichi Fujiwara, “Japan’s Misfiring Security Hedge: Discovering the Limits of Middle-Power Internationalism and Strategic Convergence,” in Bilateral Perspectives on Regional Security: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 71; Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, 197–99.
  66. Sahashi, “The DPJ Government’s Failed Foreign Policy,” 146–48.
  67. Suzuki and Wallace, “Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability,” 713–18; H. D.P. Envall, “What Kind of Japan? Tokyo’s Strategic Options in a Contested Asia,” Survival 61, no. 4 (2019): 118–20.
  68. Government of Japan, “National Security Strategy,” December 17, 2013, 1.
  69. H. D. P. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’: Japan’s New Regional Realism,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 20, no. 1 (2020): 43.
  70. Tomohiko Satake, “The New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 28; Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’,” 43–46.
  71. H. D. P. Envall, “Japan’s ‘Pivot’ Perspective: Reassurance, Restructuring, and the Rebalance,” Security Challenges 12, no. 3 (2016): 5–19.
  72. Shinzo Abe, “Remarks by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a Symposium hosted by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, April 29, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/1210942_9918.html.
  73. H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, ”Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional Security Governance,” Asian Politics & Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 93–95, 98–99.
  74. Abe Shinzō, “Futatsu no umi no majiwari,” speech at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007, https:/ /www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/19/eabe_0822.html.
  75. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018), 20; Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” 157.
  76. Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” International Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 53, 66–69.
  77. Samuels, Securing Japan, 30; Komine, Negotiating the U.S.-Japan Alliance, 165–68.
  78. Envall, “Clashing Expectations,” 71–76.
  79. Samuels, Securing Japan, 25.
  80. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’,” 47–48.
  81. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children, 206–7.
  82. Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” 233–35; Samuels, Securing Japan, 2–3.
  83. Envall, “The ‘Abe Doctrine’,” 41.
  84. Pyle, Japan Rising, 27.
  85. Samuels, Securing Japan, 2–3.
  86. Samuels, Securing Japan, 9.

 

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To cite this chapter:

Envall, HDP (2023) “Japan’s American Alliance: Forgoing Autonomy for Deterrence,” in Simon Avenell (ed.) Reconsidering Postwar Japanese History: A Handbook, Tokyo: MHM Limited, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 261–75.